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Abstract 
One of the most visible consequences of the recent liberalisation and commercialisation of European 
football is the growing levels of Arab capital investment in the European football market. Several 
professional football clubs have been taken over by Arab investors in England, France and Spain. This 
paper seeks to explore the perceptions about Arab investment in the European football market. Set 
against a background of mistrust towards foreign citizens in the continent, the paper aims to ascertain 
the perception of recent Arab investment in European football markets. This is a first stage in a larger 
project that will include, in due course, a wider selection of case studies and a wider variety of media 
outlets in the analysis. This paper presents the case studies of two clubs recently taken over by Arab 
investors: Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) in France, and Málaga CF in Spain. The paper sets to elucidate, 
whether Arab investment is perceived an opportunity for development or as a risk for the identity of the 
clubs, or both. To do so, the case studies address three different dimensions: Economic, regulatory, and 
identity. The paper employs a qualitative methodology through thematic analysis of selected publications 
in the French and Spanish press. 
 
In terms of structure the paper first discusses the global and local dynamics of sport in Arabian Peninsula, 
particularly the network between business and politics. In the second section addresses the question of 
the governance of football in relation to the shift of power from Europe and South America to elsewhere 
in the world. The last section is devoted to the analysis of the case studies: PSG owned by Qatar Sport 
Investment and Málaga CF (hereon with referred simply as Málaga) owned by Qatari Sheikh Abdullah bin 
Nasser Al-Thani. The main conclusion of our analysis is that Arab investment in these two clubs has been 
cautiously welcome. There is a dual discourse whereby positive perceptions of the takeovers are 
constantly counterbalanced with apprehension with a possible lost of the clubs’ history and local identity. 
It is difficult to separate the positive and the negative perceptions in the discourse. Both run in parallel 
constantly and it is not possible to conclude whether one or the other is prevalent.  
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Introduction 
Europe has witnessed during the last two decades two parallel processes. On the one 
hand a vast economic development and commercialisation of society. On the other 
hand, processes of globalisation have profoundly transformed European society. As 
Lincoln Allison (1998) ably puts it, sport is probably civil society at its best and, in 
consequence, it is no surprising to see both commercialisation and globalisation 
converging in the sphere of the sport sector. In this paper we focus in football. The 
game has not escaped to social and other transformations because, as Anthony King 
argues, football is nothing more, but also nothing less, that an almost perfect 
reflection of social and economic processes (King 2002). The last two decades have 
seen football being transformed, thanks to the development of the audiovisual 
industry, from a relatively minor commercial venture to a multimillion euro 
business sector. 
The massive commercialisation of European football brought about many changes, 
such as new competition formats to take advantage of lucrative contracts with 
broadcasters, among many others (King 2003). Richard Parrish and Samuli Miettinen  
(2008) pointed out, however, that for some time one of the paradoxes of the 
transformation of European football was the different globalisation levels within the 
sector. Parrish and Miettinen highlighted the fact that, whilst the players market was 
immediately liberalised in 1995 following the ruling of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in the Bosman case2, the exploitation market (that is the 
organisation and commercialisation of competitions) remained mostly divided along 
national lines. In other words, whilst club squads were profoundly globalised with 
an influx of foreign players, the ownership and business models of the clubs 
themselves remained rooted to relatively parochial levels. Furthermore, the 
exploitation of football commercial rights remained segmented along national lines 
as well. This was, of course, to be transformed. Probably the first step on the 
globalisation of football as a business was the expansion of the leagues to foreign 
markets, such as the Far East, where the English Premier League was pioneer. 
Another level was reached with the interest of foreign broadcasters in major 
European football competitions. Finally, the recent ruling of the CJEU in the Murphy 
case3 has demonstrated the unstoppable globalisation of football’s business model. 
                                                 
2 Jean Marc Bosman v. Union Royale Belge Sociétés de Football Association, case C-415/93 [1995] ECR 
I-4921 
3 Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v. QC Leisure and Others; and Karen Murphy 
v. Media Protection Services Ltd. Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08. 
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The English Premier League is now aware that it cannot sell its foreign broadcasting 
rights on a country by country basis, at least within the European Union. That is 
however outside the scope of this paper, but it serves to illustrate the level of 
football’s globalisation. 
Perhaps one of the last fortresses of ‘traditional football’ began to fall when 
European clubs accepted foreign capital, first, and full foreign ownership afterwards. 
This paper focuses in the latter. Manchester United and Liverpool have now 
American owners. The Italian family Pozzo are owners of Udinese in their own 
country, but they have also acquired Watford in England and Granada in Spain as 
well (BBC Sport 2012). Blackburn Rovers, another English club, is controlled by 
Indian poultry tycoons the Venky’s family (Harris 2011). Just to name a few. This 
paper focuses particularly in the growing levels Arab investment in European 
football. Whilst foreign ownership of football clubs is interesting per se, the social 
and cultural connotations of the new owners’ of Arab origin raises even more 
poignant questions. There is no need to explain that cultural, political and social 
tensions between the Arab-Islamic and the western cultures have risen since 9/11 
which according to some political analysts is merely the spectre of a 'clash of 
civilizations' between 'Islam' and 'the West' (Huntington 1993)4. Thus, it is pertinent 
to ask how European society perceives the arrival of Arab multimillionaires into 
football, one of the latest fortresses of local, regional and national identity.  The 
increasingly important role of Arab investors in European clubs raises questions of 
cultural differences, feelings of belonging and images of “the other”, but it also 
brings our attention to wider issues of football governance and the distribution of 
power in the geopolitics of the game. With the recent (and for some, controversial) 
decision to award the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar, it seems that a new focus of 
power in football governance is emerging to challenge the traditional dominance of 
Europe and, to a lesser extent, South America. 
Thus, this paper asks a very direct, yet complex, question: How are these new Arab 
owners perceived in the communities where their clubs are based? As this is 
certainly a very wide topic, we have decided to start with a modest approach, 
restraining ourselves in this first stage to case study research through analysis of the 
perceptions in local and national written media. We have selected two case studies 
                                                 
4 Politicians in the U.S. Congress from both parties expressed anger for the sale of port management 
businesses in six major U.S. seaports to a company based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) The 
Dubai Ports World. “They expressed concern over the security implications of an Arab state-owned 
company being given access to U.S” (see Beisecker 2006) 
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which shall help us to examine the merits of this topic for further research. Therefore, 
the paper takes on the cases of Málaga and PSG, both clubs recently bought by Arab 
capital. We base our investigation on thematic analysis of written media. For the case 
of PSG, analysis is based on the coverage of a national news magazine (Marianne), 
whilst the case of Málaga involves one local (Diario Sur) and two national (El País 
and El Mundo) newspapers.  
Following this introduction, the paper proceeds now in five steps. First, we provide 
a concise literature overview of the process of football globalisation and the role that 
Arab capital has played in the internationalisation of the European game. This sets 
up the analytical framework, emphasizing those foreign capital takeovers are one of 
the key features of football’s commercialisation and that Arab capital investment in 
the European game is rising exponentially. Second, we discuss the methodological 
considerations of our study. We move then to present the paper’s empirical research. 
The third section focuses on the case of PSG, whilst the fourth section deals with 
Málaga’s takeover. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main finding and 
discusses avenues for further research. 
Evolution and ‘glocalisation’ of football 
Before moving to the analysis of the reactions to the takeovers of Málaga and PSG, it 
is necessary to provide some background information on the economic and social 
processes that underpin the transformation of European football. This section 
presents a succinct review of the literature in two main areas: First, on the evolution 
and globalisation of football in Europe; second, on the strategic planning of Arab 
investment in sport and its impact on the mentioned globalisation of the game.  
It is necessary to start with a short overview of how football evolution has been 
conceptualised. Richard Giulianotti  (1999) provides here a very useful division of 
the evolution of football. He argues that three clear stages can be differentiated: 
‘traditional’, ‘modern’ and ‘post-modern’. The ‘traditional’ period lasted until after 
the First World War, and it was marked by ‘the establishment of the game’s rules, 
their international diffusion and the formation of national associations to administer 
the sport, under the aegis of ruling elites’  (Giulianotti 1999: 166). The ‘modern’ era of 
football is sub-divided into three periods. ‘Early modernity’ is the first of these three 
sub-divisions, running from the 1920s to the Second World War. During that time 
the Olympic Games and the World Cup cemented football’s global status. During 
this period football became the major national sport in Europe and Latin America, 
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players started to emerge as national heroes and earn better than average wages, but 
they lacked long-term security (ibid.: 167). The ‘intermediate modernity’ of football 
lasted from the post war period to the early 1960s. In this period continental 
confederations of national FAs (such as UEFA) emerged as another tier of 
governance for the game, and, above all, television became more prevalent in family 
homes, making the skill of top players known world-wide (ibid.: 168). ‘Late 
modernity’ ran from the early 1960s to the late 1980s. Consumer culture and youth 
culture had a massive impact on the game, with players becoming superstars and 
icons of modernity (Manchester United’s Northern Irish star George Best is one of 
the best examples); revenues from sponsorship and merchandising started to 
overcome gate-receipts as the first source of income for clubs (ibid: 168). 
Football in ‘post-modern’ era began in the late 1980s and it has been evolving ever 
since. It has entailed a major commercialisation of the sporting activity and the 
influence of television companies in controlling clubs and financing the game 
(Giulianotti 1999: 168). Brand new or totally refurbished stadiums became a symbol 
of this new era of football, where television deals and ticket distribution policies 
maximise income, but may in turn damage the interests of the most dedicated 
supporters (ibid: 169). In the ‘post-modern’ era fans represent a new middle class, ‘a 
new kind of football spectator keen to produce and consume a variety of football 
media’ (ibid: 169). With television revenues multiplying the benefits of top clubs, 
tournaments have become a huge business and the elite players enjoy higher than 
ever wages, especially after the 1995 Bosman ruling. This paper, of course, delves 
well deep into what Giulianotti labelled as the post-modern era of football. We could 
also perhaps refer to it as the ‘glocal’ era  (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004) of football 
business. 
The business and governance of ‘post-modern’ football 
Having conceptualised the evolution of football to its current days, we turn now to a 
review of the business and governance issues raised by the development of football 
as an industry. The objective is to analyse some of the characteristics of this new 
post-modern era of football that has been described by Giulianotti and others in the 
literature. Perhaps the most prominent characteristic of this new era of European 
football is commercialisation (García 2010; Downward et al. 2009; Hamil and Walters 
2010). The commercialisation of European football has gone hand in hand with the 
increase in the revenues from the selling of the game’s broadcasting rights. The 
economic growth of European professional football can be measured through some 
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indicators, such as the revenue generated by Europe’s top professional football 
leagues, the so-called big five (i.e. England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain), as 
illustrated in the following table:  
 
 
 
 
Table 1- Total revenue of the big five European leagues (in Million Euros)   
 Premier 
League 
Ligue 1 Serie A Bundesliga La Liga 
1999/00 1,219 607 954 681 722 
2000/01 1,557 644 1,027 880 676 
2001/02 1,747 643 1,017 1,043 776 
2002/03 1,791 689 1,042 1,108 847 
2003/04 1,977 655 1,052 1,058 953 
2004/05 1,975 696 1,219 1,236 1,029 
2005/06 1,995 910 1,277 1,195 1,158 
2006/07 2,273 972 1,064 1,379 1,326 
2007/08 2,441 989 1,421 1,438 1,438 
2008/09 2,326 1,048 1,494 1,575 1,501 
2009/10 2,479 1,072 1,532 1,664 1,622 
2010/11 2,742 1,080 1,700 1,730 1,730 
 +125% +78% +78% +154% +139.6% 
 
Source:  (Deloitte 2011) 
 
Table 1 provides a simple snapshot of the raising income levels of professional 
football in Europe. These five leagues are by far the more commercialised as they 
have access to the largest television markets in the continent and overseas. It can be 
seen how European football has doubled its income in the last decade of the 20th 
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century.  For the German Bundesliga, the income has risen by a staggering 154%. 
These figures also provide one of the justifications for our case study selection, 
Málaga and PSG. Both are clubs involved in the so-called Big 5 European Leagues; 
that is to say, the richest football competitions in the continent. The former belongs 
to the second richest league, whilst PSG, in France, anchors in a slightly less affluent 
football market, yet prominent enough. The data presented above clearly show the 
increasing and rapid commercialization of football, which is inherently related to the 
process of globalization or ‘glocalisation’  (Giulianotti and Robertson 2004) that the 
paper seeks to explore.  
However, table 1 does only provide an indication of the positive side of post-modern 
football’s commercialisation. The increase in revenue has also meant, among other 
things, an increase in players’ wages. The current average income-to-wages ratio of 
the English Premier League is 70 percent (Pitt-Brooke 2012). That is to say, English 
top clubs have to dedicate almost two thirds of their income to pay their players. 
That excludes any other expenses. It is not unheard of football clubs in Europe that 
exceed the 100 percent. That is to say, their wage bill is a year is bigger than their 
income (see Deloitte 2011). Thus, it is not difficult to find academic accounts arguing 
that the finances of European football are out of hand. Hamil and Walters (2010) 
point out that despite the income level, football clubs have amassed serious levels of 
debt that could question their existence as a viable businesses. Thus, clubs in Europe 
are in need of extra capital to cover the debt accumulated by an ever increasing wage 
bill (see Deloitte 2011 for a detailed analysis of the increased wage-bill in European 
football).  
Amongst a backdrop of economic recession in the continent, it is difficult to find 
capital investment of European origin in any sector, let alone sport or professional 
football. Therefore, investment comes from those economies that are not in recession 
and can generate benefits to be invested.  It is outside the scope of this paper to enter 
into detailed analysis of the origin of European football clubs’ new foreign owners, 
but it is well known that the current economic powers include China, India, Brazil, 
Russia and the Gulf region among others. In this respect, another of the 
consequences/indicators of a post-modern football era that is characterised by 
commercialisation is the takeover by investors as a way of injecting capital into the 
clubs. Over half of all English Premier League clubs now have majority shareholders 
who are not of British origin; the Championship (English football’s second tier) may 
be moving towards a similar trend, as is the rest of European leagues (Millward 2012, 
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see also Nauright and Ramfjord 2010) Crucially, these are increasingly Arab 
investors. 
Debates around the consequences of this post-modern football’s era of 
commercialisation raise a further important question, which is that of governance. 
The governance of football has been traditionally described as a pyramid, whereby 
the Federation of International Football Associations (FIFA) sits at the apex. 
Immediately below, the continental associations, such as the Union of European 
Football Associations (UEFA) or the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) are the 
governing bodies at continental level. The pyramid goes then down to the each 
country, where national football association, professional football leagues, clubs are 
players used to be firmly situated at the bottom of the pyramid (García 2007, 2009). 
For a long time, the power within the geopolitics of football lied firmly in Europe 
and, to some extent, America. As an example, football’s flagship competition, the 
FIFA World Cup was always organised in either of the two continents for a long 
time between 1930 and 1998. It was only in 2002 when Japan and Korea were 
awarded the first World Cup outside Europe or America.  Since then, the tensions 
between the traditional focus of power (the centre) and the periphery has been rising. 
The organization of the 2010 World Coup in South Africa was the first for the 
African continent and, to a certain extent, it did not raise many protests. However, 
FIFA’s recent decision of awarding the 2022 World Cup to Qatar, in the Gulf region, 
has been severely criticized in Europe, by the press, politicians and football officials 
alike. There seems to be a clear tension emerging here, with FIFA’s willingness to 
take football to new markets, whilst European football tries to keep its position in the 
governance of the global game. Therefore, the increasing influence of Arab capital in 
European clubs can only add to this already complex network of economic and 
political interests. 
Thus, in this section we have so far outlined the historical evolution of football and 
the economic and governance consequences of the recent commercialisation and 
globalisation of the game. We have also pointed out the rise of the Gulf region as an 
economic and political power in football’s governance. The available academic 
literature has clearly identified the arrival of foreign owners as one of the 
characteristics of the commercial development of European professional football. An 
increasing number of those foreign owners are of Arab origin, which raises questions 
around economic investment, football’s cultural identity in Europe and the relations 
between western and Arabic cultures. Having identified this trend, there are still two 
key questions to be answered in order to understand this process: why the Arabian 
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Peninsula is becoming such a lucrative destination for major sports events and 
brands?  How do we explain the interest of the Arabian Gulf investors in 
international football? The paper now turns to outline the main arguments that the 
literature has put forward to give tentative answers to these questions. This shall 
conclude our succinct review of the literature that provides the context for the paper. 
The commercialization of sport in the Arabian Peninsula 
Having established the rising importance of Arab capital for European football, this 
section now seeks to explain the interests for the investors themselves. The paper 
reviews here the strategic decisions taken in the Arabian Gulf region that have 
motivated their investment in European football clubs. First and foremost, the 
literature clearly points out that the interest in football clubs is not just a hobby of a 
few rich businesspersons. It is actually part of a well planned wider strategy that 
involves other sports beyond football. 
Large investments are made in the Gulf countries in the staging and sponsoring of 
the world’s leading sports events and in the building of sporting infrastructures. The 
aim is to open the Arabian Peninsula to the world of business and finance and to 
establish a global reputation as a leading destination for the staging of international 
sporting events. This is clearly illustrated in the following statement by the 
managing director of Dubai Duty Free (owned by the Al-Maktoum family): 
Whenever and wherever we can, we reinforce the message that Dubai Duty Free is one of the 
top airport retail operations in the world, and sports sponsorship is an extremely effective way of 
spreading that message (Barnes and Britcher 2004,. n.p). 
 
As an illustrative example of the growing interest of the Gulf States in the sport 
industry, Table 2 (below) provides examples of major sponsorship deals of state 
airline companies with major sports clubs and international competitions. The race 
to sponsor major football and sport events, as well as particular clubs, by major Gulf 
airlines has been conceptualised as a battle for the domination of the European sport 
sponsorship industry (Amara 2012). At this point it is necessary to remind that these 
are state-owned airlines and, therefore, they are another instrument of the Gulf 
region’s economic and political elite strategy to develop their business through the 
sport industry (Amara 2012).  
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Table 2- Sport sponsorship by major Gulf region airlines (Source: Amara 2012)  
Company Sponsorship  Type  
 
 
Emirates (UAE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIFA 
 
FIFA Partner from 2007 to 2014 
(estimated at up £25 Million per Year) 
Arsenal £357 million naming of Arsenal Stadium 
until 2021 
Paris St Germain Shirt branding until 2013–2014 season 
Hamburger SV LED boards at Noordbank Arena (to 2012 
and beyond) 
Olympiacos CFP Fly Emirates’ signage displayed at the 
Karaiskaki Stadium, the home of 
Olympiacos. 
AC Milan Branding of San Siro Stadium until 2010 
and sponsorship of AC Milan shirt (since 
2010. Emirates had to €60m for four years 
contract according to some estimates) 
 
Real Madrid  
A five-year sponsorship agreement (a 
Partner and official airline of the club) that 
has then been extended to become the 
club’s shirt sponsor from the 20013-14 
season 
Asian Football Confederation Official Sponsor and Official Airline of the 
AFC (until 2012) 
Rugby Union Partner of Rugby World Cup 2011; 
the first official sponsor of the IRB’s panel 
of international referees until 2011; Title 
Sponsor and Official Airline of the London 
Sevens from 2004 to 2011; Official shirt 
sponsor of the England and Samoa Sevens 
team ; shirt sponsor of Australia’s Super 
14 rugby team until 201 
Yacht Racing Emirates Team New Zealand (until 2011 
and beyond) 
Powerboat Racing the Dubai leg of the UIM Class 1 World 
Powerboat Championship since 1992 
Golf Official Airline of 15 Golf Tournaments 
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Cricket Official partner of the ICC Cricket World 
Cup 2011 
Horse Racing 
 
the sponsor of the $3 million Emirates 
Airline Breeders’ Cup Turf and the $2 
million Emirates Airline Breeders’ Cup Filly 
& Mare Turf races at the annual Breeders’ 
Cup World Championships 
Tennis Official Carrier for the Dubai Tennis 
Championships since its inception in 1993 
Racing  The Official Airline partner of Dubai Grand 
Racing since 2004 
 
 
 
 
Qatar Airways (Qatar) 
 
 
 
Cycling Airline Official Partner of World’s First 
Major Cycling Race Of 2011 in Doha 
 
Hockey 
the title sponsor of the EuroHockey 
Nations Championships 2007 
 
Tennis Qatar Airways Official Carrier Of The Qatar 
ExxonMobil Open 2011 Tennis 
Tournament in Doha 
Cricket  Official Airline status with the English Test 
Match Grounds 
Power Boat Sponsor Of International Powerboat 
Championship Race (Doha leg) 
Golf sponsorship of the Commercial bank 
Qatar Masters 
Football the official airline to Qatar’s bid to host 
the 2022 FIFA World Cup 
 
 
Etihad Airways (Qatar)  
Melbourne Stadium Naming of Melbourne Stadium  (Etihad 
Stadium) 
Formula 1 The title sponsor of the F1 Etihad Airways 
Abu Dhabi Grand Prix. 
Golf Diamond Sponsor and the Official Airline 
for the Abu Dhabi Golf Championship 
Rugby  the main sponsor of the UK Premiership 
rugby team, Harlequins Rugby FC 
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Football The official shirt sponsor, partner and 
stadium naming rights of Premier League 
side Manchester City. 
 
 
Gulf Air (Bahrain)  
Formula 1  sponsorship of the Gulf Air Bahrain Grand 
Prix (from its inception until 2010) 
Football The official sponsor of Oman Football 
Association (OFA) (the national Senior, 
Olympic, Under-19 and Under-17 teams); 
sponsor of Championship football club 
Queens Park Rangers 
 
As it can be seen, the sponsorship portfolio covers a wide range of sports, clubs and 
events, both in Europe, the Gulf region and beyond. To explain the rationale behind 
Emirates Airlines’ sponsorship agreement with Arsenal Football Club for the 
naming rights of Arsenal’s new £357 million stadium, Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al-
Maktoum, Chairman of Emirates Airlines, states that: 
Sport sponsorship provides an international platform to connect with our customers. We believe 
sponsorship is one of the best ways of getting closer to our customers. It allows us to share and 
support their interests and to build a personal relationship with them. There is no greater vehicle 
for this than through English football and we are looking forward to a long and very happy 
relationship with Arsenal. 
The most spectacular investment, which received worldwide media coverage and 
announced a new trend for Arab investment in international football market, is the 
takeover of the English Premiership football club Manchester City by Abu Dhabi 
United Group for Development and Investment (ABUG). According to a number of 
estimates, ABUG paid £150 million to become the major shareholder of the club. 
Through Hydra Properties, ABUG is already involved in several sports sponsorship 
deals, and is building a new football academy in Abu Dhabi with Italian soccer giant 
Inter Milan (Amara 2012). 
The saga of Arab investments in the global industry of football has continued with 
the takeover, in 2010, of Málaga Football Club in Spain by Sheikh Abdullah bin 
Nasser Al-Thani, member of the Qatar Royal family in Qatar, for an estimated cost of 
€36 million that include the payment of the club’s debt, with the promise to invest 
€70 for in the building of a new stadium (Amara 2012).. In the same year Qatar Sport 
Investment (QSI) first acquired 70 percent shares of PSG. In June of 2012 the rest of 
the shares (30%) were bought by QSI from US company Colony Capital, to become 
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the sole owner of the club 5 .  The purchase of PSG is part of a wider Qatari 
investment in France 6. Al-Jazeera bought parts of the broadcasting right of the 
French league from 2012-2013 for €61 million a year, and paid the same amount for 
the broadcasting in France of 133 matches (including on internet and Mobile) of the 
UEFA Champions League. It is worth noting here that the director of QSI is also the 
director of Aljazeera Sport and the CEO of PSG.  
Kuwaiti investors have also joined the race for the acquisition of foreign football 
clubs. On July 10 2012, Al-Hasawi family, who made their fortune in refrigeration 
and air-conditioning, announced their takeover of the Championship club 
Nottingham Forest7. Table 3 (below) provides some initial figures about the amount 
and the type of Arab investments in European clubs.  
 
Table 3- Arab capital investment in European football clubs 
Country Club  Investor Investment 
UAE Manchester City 
(England) 
 
Abu Dhabi United 
Group for Development 
and Investment (ABUG) 
€175 million 
UAE  TSV 1860 München 
 
Hasan Abdullah 
Mohamed Ismaik chair 
and owner of MARYA,  a 
private Abu Dhabi based 
investment company 
sports, design, 
construction, real 
estate, automotive, 
travel, energy and oil 
and gas. 
49 percent of voting 
rights for €18 million 
                                                 
5 QSI has acquired the remaining 30% stake in Paris Saint-Germain in a deal that values the French 
Ligue 1 club at €100 million. Retrieved from http://www.sportbusiness.com/news/185199/qsi-
completes-psg-buy-out 
6 It is estimated that Qatar has invested 6 billion euros in France. Qatar Investment Authority has 
shares in: France Telecom (1%), Lagardere (13%). LVMH (1%), Total (3%), Veolia (5%), Vinci (8%), 
Vivendi (5%). Source Marianne 5-11  January 2013. 
7 Nottingham Forest sold to Kuwait's Al-Hasawi family from Doughty estate for a nominal fee . 
Retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2171720/Nottingham-Forest-sold-
Kuwaits-Al-Hasawi-family.html#ixzz2JNVOyNOF 
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Qatar Málaga FC (Spain) Sheikh Abdullah bin 
Nasser Al-Thani 
€36 million share 
€70 million investment 
Qatar PSG (Paris) Qatar Sport Investment Total of €140 million 
(€100 million per year 
up to 2016 for the 
transfer of players)  
Kuwait Nottingham Forest NFFC Group Holdings 
Ltd (Al Hasawi family. 
Specialised in property, 
hotels and air 
conditioning) 
According to estimates 
the planned spending is 
up to €30 million. 
 
Source: Own elaboration 
One could argue that Gulf states’ worldwide investment in sport in general and in 
football in particular is facilitated by a strong network between political and 
business elites, including members of royal families, states’ sovereign wealth funds 
(such as Qatar Investment Authority) , local private companies—and foreign 
associates— specialised in tourism, retail, hospitality and luxury products (Amara 
and Theodoraki 2010). This networking between the local and global political and 
corporate interests is not necessarily dictated by an orthodox politico-ideological 
agenda. For instance, the Arab–-Israeli conflict was not an obstacle for the alliance 
between businessmen from the Gulf region and from Israel. Sulaiman El-Fahim, 
chairman of the Arab Union for Real Estate Development, who is also linked with 
Inter Milan Soccer Academy in Abu Dhabi, and Al-Faraj family from Saudi Arabia, 
which is said to be related to Sabic, the Gulf’s biggest petrochemical company, 
worked closely with Israeli intermediates specializing in banking and property for 
the takeover of the then English Premiership club Portsmouth FC. The club was 
previously owned by Alexandre Gaydamak, French–-Israeli businessman of Russian 
descent, described by Forbes magazine (2009) as a ‘son of controversial businessman 
and former Jerusalem mayoral candidate Arcadi Gaydamak.’ These nonconformist 
alliances between business and politics within and beyond the Gulf region have 
opened the door in Europe for integrations and speculations about the true agenda 
behind Gulf States’ global investments in sport (as well as in other sectors) and its 
impact on the governance of sport in general and in football in particular. This 
illustrated in the following statement by Daniel Bilalian, head of sport for the state-
owned France Television Network, reflecting on Aljazeera (BeInsport) investment in 
France:  
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These people do not present themselves as wanting a return on their money. It is political – they 
want their country to be known […] From an economic point of view, [Al Jazeera] act 
unreasonably. The fact is that their priority is Qatar's influence in the world (Randal 2011) 
 
In conclusion, the investment of Arab capital in European football is just part of a 
wider, and carefully designed, plan to increase the economic and political stature of 
the Gulf States worldwide. It is characterised by an inextricable combination of 
private and public capital, working together with a twofold objective. On the one 
hand, Gulf States want to be recognised as important and profitable business 
destinations in a diversity of sectors, not just sport. This basically means their 
objective is to attract investment. On the other hand, the Gulf States aim to use their 
own capital to invest abroad to establish a wider network of economic, political and 
sporting influence. In short, the literature points out that this is a carefully designed 
strategy that even bridges over the Arab-Israeli conflict for the benefit of business, if 
necessary. In this strategy, sport in general (and football in particular) has been 
identified as one of the best opportunities, as it is both a business and a social 
venture.  
This section completes now the conceptual and historical review of the literature in 
relation to our paper’s topic. It has been established how Arab takeovers are one of 
the characteristics of European football’s commercialisation. This, in turn, raises 
questions of economic management, governance and identity of football clubs. It has 
also been pointed out that the increased Arab investment in European football is 
part of a wider and carefully designed strategy by political and business elites in the 
Gulf Region. The paper turns now to present the results of our empirical research. 
First, though, a short section outlines our methodological considerations. 
Methodological considerations 
Having conducted a review of the relevant literature to set the paper’s context, this 
section describes our data collection and analysis strategy. This paper has used a 
qualitative case-study design through inductive thematic analysis of written sources. 
The qualitative case study approach adopted in this study facilitates the exploration 
of the complex context of glocalisation of football, the international shift of the 
governance of professional football and the increase of Arab capital (particularly 
from the rich Gulf states) into European football. The idea behind case study 
approach, as explained by Yin (2003, quoted in Baxter and Jack 2008: 545) is to 
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ensure that ‘the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of lenses 
which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood’.  
The case studies selected are PSG and Málaga. France and Spain are both dominant 
football nations in Europe, among the Big 5 leagues, as it has been explained already 
elsewhere in the paper. They are both confronted by strong regional football 
identities (Basque, Galician and Catalan regions in Spain; Basque and Corsica in 
France) as well as by similar global trends of commercialisation and increased 
movement of players and capital. Top clubs in France and Spain are looking for 
external sources of funding to tackle the impact of economic recession, which is even 
deeper in the latter case (see Barajas and Rodríguez 2010 for details on the financial 
situation of Spanish football). While Spanish clubs have been relatively more open to 
foreign investment, French clubs, at least until recently (PSG and Monaco), took a 
more conservative approach to external funding and particularly foreign ownership. 
Thus, the selection of the two cases shall also allow for a comparative approach of 
the reaction to Arab investment coming from different traditions of foreign 
ownership. 
In relation to this paper, Arab investment in Spain cannot be explained only in 
rational economic terms, taking into account the shared history of Spain with the 
Arab world. PSG as a football club has a unique identity as it is the only top club in 
Paris (it is the club of the French capital), while Malaga is comparatively a 
smaller/regional club. One could argue that the significance and symbolic of Qatar’s 
investment in these two clubs are different. Having said that, both clubs serve major 
cities in their countries and both have a history of prowess and high achievements. 
In this case, PSG certainly tops Málaga. The latter, whilst being a relatively well 
established club, has not seen major trophies unlike PSG who has even won 
European club competitions. 
To make the data manageable, for the case of Málaga, we used the Lexis-Nexis 
database to access the local newspaper Sur and the national newspapers El País and 
El Mundo. Lexis-Nexis provides remote online access to digital content of the 
publications, allowing to search by keywords and date, among other criteria. These 
three newspapers were chosen as they comprise a local publication in the area of 
Málaga and two reputed national newspapers of different ideological line. Whilst El 
País is identified with the centre-left, El Mundo tends to align with centre-right 
ideologies. The inclusion of a local news outlet is of paramount importance given the 
links of football to local identity in Europe (García 2010). Moreover, the most basic 
premise of information and communication theory dictates that news tend to be 
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more reported if they are closer to the target public of the media outlet. Thus, local 
Málaga media will feature a more comprehensive coverage of their football team’s 
ventures than national Spanish media. For this paper the search extended two 
calendar months either side of the date of the formal takeover of Málaga by Sheikh 
Abdullah bin Nasser Al-Thani, June 10th 2010. The keywords used were ‘Málaga’, 
‘compra’ (takeover), and ‘nuevo dueño’ (new owner). As for the French case the 
analysis focused on series of articles devoted to Qatar investment in France 
published between December 2011 and January 2013 in Marianne Magazine, which 
ideologically sits more at the left.  
The main research effort consists of analysing the news and articles published 
during the period of the take overs. The aim is to describe the relationship and 
meaning of different words and phrases used within text; it is useful at providing an 
insight into major opinions and beliefs held regarding the particular subject, 
identifying the main consensus of the media as a whole (Gratton and Jones, 2010) . 
Whilst the limits of written press analysis are acknowledged, even more in today’s 
social media era, it is submitted here that these can still yield interesting results as to 
how Arab takeovers are perceived.  
Hence, the thematic analysis deployed in this paper is based on an inductive 
approach, which seeks to extract themes and make sense of them in relation to the 
ways they were constructed/produced in the text, as well as in relation to broader 
(societal) contexts. Returned articles were firstly read and their content was coded to 
allow the further classification of information and to assign meaning to words and 
phrases (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The articles were inductively organised into 
broader themes, which form the basis of this paper. The analysis thus seeks to 
understand the interplay between culture, business and politics in the global sport 
system as depicted in the two selected case studies. We do not claim that the selected 
press content is representative of French and Spanish opinions but they are only 
illustrative examples by which we can make sense of the general mood around Arab 
investment in football in France and Spain. 
The paper now proceeds to present the result of our empirical research. This will be 
done in two parts: we deal first with the case of PSG to move then to Málaga. 
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Qatar, France and PSG: Money and geopolitics 
One of the key themes that emerged from French media coverage of Qatar’s 
investment in PSG, the club of the French capital, is the link between “money and 
geopolitics”. There is an over emphasis of the small size of Qatar, in terms of 
territory and demography, in contrast to its huge appetite for business ventures in 
Europe. France is described as the door for Qatar’s invasion of Europe.  An article 
published in Marianne Magazine 7th December 2011, under the tile of ‘Qatar invents  
Sport Power’8, Qatar is described as ‘a mini-petro-monarchy’, ‘authoritarian’ with the 
ambition of becoming ‘a hyper sport power’, being already a media empire, thanks 
to Aljazeera News channel. 
Organisation de la coupe du monde 2022, mondial de hand 2015, mondiaux d’athlétisme 2017, 
premier sponsor maillot du Barça avec la Qatar Foundation, transport des cyclistes du Tour de 
France avec Qatar Airways. Et l’appétit glouton de cette mini-pétromonarchie autoritaire est 
insatiable, avec la France pour met préféré [The organisation of the 2022 FIFA world Cup, the 
2015 World Championship in handball, the 2017 World Athletics, Qatar Foundation sponsorship 
of Barça shirt, transport of cyclists for the Tour de France by Qatar Airways. The growing appetite 
of this mini authoritarian oil-monarchy is endless, with France as a preferred destination] 
(emphasis added). (Marianne Magazine, 7TH December 2011). 
According to some analysts in France interviewed by Marianne Magazine Qatar is 
building up a network (i.e. a zone of cultural influence) around sport and football. It 
is claimed that Qatar has influence in the IOC, it has presence in major football clubs, 
it is leading the Asian Football Confederation, and it is hosting the 2022 World Cup. 
Aljazeera Sport Network owned by the Qatari state has TV rights for major football 
competitions/tournaments. These illustrate the international geo-politic strategy of 
Qatar in and through sport.   
Qatar a des pions au CIO, et s’il a été malheureux avec sa candidature à la présidence de la Fifa – 
il a tout de même remporté l’organisation de la Coupe du monde en 2022, il est à la tête de 
l’association asiatique (AFC) et présent dans des grands clubs comme le Barça (Qatar Fondation, 
sponsor maillot pour plus de 30 millions par an). La chaîne qatari Al Jazeera Sport est présente 
dans le monde entier avec des droits dans beaucoup de sports. Dans ce cas, on parle davantage 
d’une stratégie géopolitique internationale dans le sport [Qatar has its agents in the IOC, 
although it was not successful with its bid for the presidency of FIFA, Qatar has been successful 
for its bid for the 2022 FIFA world Cup. Qatar is leading Asian Confederation of Football and 
present in major clubs such as Barça (Qatar Foundation is paying 30 million Euros a year to be 
the official sponsor of Barça shirt). The Qatari channel Aljazeera Sport is present everywhere 
holding the broadcasting rights of many sports. In this case it is more accurate to talk about a 
strategy of international geopolitics in sport] (Marianne Magazine, 7th December 2011). 
                                                 
88 Since then Marianne Magazine devoted two editions about Qatar: «Comment ils ont livré la France au 
Qatar» (5-11 January 2013) «Le Qatar a l’assaut de la France …et de ses banlieues» (27 April-May, 2013). 
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The same magazine, devoted an extended dossier in its January 2013 edition, using 
this time a more virulent narrative exemplified in the title ‘CAC 40, Sport, Television, 
Banlieues9: they delivered France to Qatar’. ‘They’ here refers to governments under 
former president Nicholas Sarkozy (representing the right) as well as under current 
president Francois Hollande (representing the left). It is used to explain the 
continuity of French governments’ strategy on the one hand, and questions the 
ideological divides between right and left in French politics today.  The document 
starts with the following account, which announces the editorial position of the 
magazine, i.e. protectionist and to some extent anti-Qatari.   
Sous Sarkosy comme avec Hollande, le richissime émirat dispose des mêmes facilités pour 
racheter des pans entiers de notre économie. Que signifie l’appétit d’ogre de petit pays ? 
Pourquoi Paris lui ouvre-t-il ses portes ? [Under Sarkozy as under Holland, the wealthy emirate 
has under its disposition the same facilities to buy large chunks of our economy. What is the 
significance of the bulky appetite of this small country? Why Paris has opened its doors [to 
Qatar?] (Emphasis added) (Marianne Magazine, 5th January, 2013, p. 12). 
The opening article goes as far as to question the logic behind offering Qatar the 2022 
FIFA World Cup, describing the privileges –bestowing gifts— that Qatar received 
from the high sphere of politics in France:  
Organiser la Coupe du Monde de football dans un pays ou ce sport n’intéresse personne et va 
nécessiter la construction de stades munis de sols réfrigérants pour pouvoir supporter des 
températures a 45 C (bonjour Kyoto!) ca n’interpelle personne dans le monde su sport- pas 
même Michel Platini- ni dans celui de l’écologie…le president a meme donne de sa personne en 
faisant pression dur le président du PSG, Sébastien Bazin, gérant du fond Colony Capital, pour lui 
demander de vendre le PSG selon les conditions du Qatar. Bazin proposait au Qataris 30% du 
club de foot parisien pour 30millions d’euros. Après intervention presidentielle, ils en ont 
récupéré 70% pour 40%. (ils sont désormais propritaires)  
[Organising the World Cup in a country where sport does not interest anybody and where it 
necessitates the building of stadia equipped with refrigerated floors to support the heat, 45 
degrees (good morning Kyoto!) does not call to mind anybody in the world of sport— even 
Michel Platini—nor in the world of ecology…The president himself [Sarkozy] gave his person in 
putting pressure on the president of PSG, Sebastien Bazin, the manager of Colony Capital, to sell 
PSG according to Qatar’s conditions. Bazin proposed to Qatar 30% of the club for 30 million 
Euros. After the president’s intervention Qatar bought 70 % of the club for 40 million (they now 
own 100 % of the club)] (Marianne Magazine, 5th January, 2013, p. 12). 
For Marianne, Qatar investment in sport in France cannot be explained in merely 
economic terms.  Hence, it is a political phenomenon resulting from the pervert 
                                                 
9 The term banlieues is usually used to describe the periphery or the estates suburbs of French cities. It 
is becoming a general term used in the French media to refer to “deviant multiculturalism”, “anti-
republicans”, “Islamism2 and “social unrest”. Qatar announcement to invest at the level of 50 million 
Euros in les Banlieues, targeting mainly small enterprises, has created a controversy in the French 
media and particularly among far right circles. The political establishment in France is simply accused 
of delivering part of French territory to so called “Islamist Wahabi ideology”.        
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consequences of globalisation which allows small-peripheral wealthy countries to 
acquire tremendous political influence.   
The following section analyses the reaction of the local and national press to the 
arrival of Sheikh Al-Thani to Málaga. This was not the first takeover by foreign 
capital of a Spanish club, but it was the first club taken over by an Arab investor in 
the country. Whilst the search included two national newspapers, it is not surprising 
that the large majority of the articles returned were published in the local daily 
Diario Sur.  
Málaga’s perception of their new owner 
The analysis of the press reports on Málaga’s takeover has revealed three main 
themes. The first two themes could be categorised as direct reactions to the takeover 
itself. Basically, the media try to answer a very simple question: Will the new owner 
be positive of negative for our club? In this respect, there are completely opposing 
views. On the one hand, there is a positive discourse that sees a historical 
opportunity for Málaga (both the club and the city) to reach new heights in Spanish 
and European football. On the other hand, there is a more cautious approach that 
questions the motives of the new owners and wonders whether they might represent 
a threat to the club’s local history and identity. This is mostly expressed through 
fears that the new owners might want to change the club’s colours, the jersey or 
whether the new owners will invest in the local football academy or not. Thus, there 
is both a positive and a more hesitant (at times negative) discourse around the 
takeover. What is perhaps more interesting, beyond the mere presence of contrasting 
discourses, is that it is extremely difficult to disassociate both themes from each 
other. For each positive account there is almost invariably a more hesitating account. 
In a way, the perfect analogy for this is that of a double-edged sword. The takeover 
is seen as both edges at the same time, and one cannot be understood without the 
other. 
The third theme identified requires some more abstract reasoning, but it is also 
clearly present: there is a characterisation of the new Arab owners of Málaga. 
Sometimes this is simply factual but in others it develops into a social construction. 
The ways in which the new owners are described in the press make for a very 
interesting characterisation. These main themes are now analysed in turn. The 
section first deals with that double-edged approach to the takeover. It then goes on 
to present the characterisation of ‘El jeque’, Málaga’s new owner. 
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Opportunity of development versus the risk to history and tradition 
The most usual way to describe the takeover of Málaga in the press is the Spanish 
expression ‘salto de calidad’ (quality jump). It is expected that the new money will 
allow the club to improve its ailing status:  
El jeque qatarí es el personaje clave de la nueva trayectoria del Málaga. Está dispuesto a 
hacer una inversión importante para que el club dé un salto de calidad y pueda competir 
con los equipos más fuertes del fútbol español. Ocupará la presidencia y ya es el dueño de la 
entidad desde el pasado viernes [The Qatari sheikh is the key person in the future of Málaga. 
He is willing to invest heavily in the club to give a quality jump in order to compete with the 
strongest teams in Spanish football. He will be the club chairman and he is the owner since 
last Friday] (Diario Sur 2010b). 
There is mention of this project being the ‘Most ambitious in Málaga’s history’ 
(Diario Sur 2010c) that shall aim as high as playing the Champions League (Diario 
Sur 2010d). Perhaps the best summary of this feeling is an article in Diario Sur titled 
‘Ilusión colectiva’ (Collective excitement), that refers to football as one of the few 
possibilities of evasion from the hard economic crisis:  
Nos tenemos que agarrar a la pelota, la misma que a nivel local ha ilusionado a la sociedad 
por la llegada de un jeque con el que se intuye que podríamos salir de pobres [We have to 
rely on football, which at local level is raising people’s hope thanks to the arrival of the 
Sheikh. He will, hopefully, take us out of poverty] (Diario Sur 2010e) 
The objective of playing the Champions League, which is a symbol of football 
prowess, represents perfectly the high levels of hope that the arrival of the new 
owner created in Málaga. That was certainly a very positive vision because it had the 
potential to raise the level of the club. It has taken two years, but in the 2012-13 
season Málaga has actually playing the UEFA Champions League, which sees almost 
a celebration with a sellout crowd for every game irrespective of the results. Málaga 
performed well in the competition, driving high the spirits in the city. Málaga 
progressed through the group stages and was only knocked-out of the competition 
in the quarter finals by the runners-up Borussia Dortmund. 
Thus, the possibility of sporting success linked to new capital is perceived as a 
positive outcome of the takeover. Probably in that respect the origin of the capital is 
superfluous, as any injection of new money into the club is likely to be well received. 
There is, however, a nuance to that. The new owner is not only perceived to be as an 
investor but, crucially, as an incredibly wealthy business man. There is repeated 
mention in the press of the affluent economic situation of Qatar, with reference to 
‘petrodólares’ (petrodollars). The new owner is depicted almost as a having a 
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bottomless purse (see below for more on this). In this respect, therefore, the Arab 
origin is rather positively perceived. The central idea is that the new owner does not 
bring just money to the club, but a lot of money. For that reason it is thought that the 
club could ‘make history in the Spanish league’ (Diario Sur 2010f) 
Whilst a sense of anticipation is perceived in the press with the arrival of the new 
owner, there is also a very marked anxiety as to whether the Arab owners will 
respect the history and the identity of the club. This relates very clearly to the fear of 
the unknown, which is moreover reinforced by the very different cultural and even 
ethnic origin of the Qatari owner. In the days after the takeover, there are many 
reports as to whether the new owner will change the internal management structure 
of the club. Just two weeks after the change of ownership, the local Diario Sur 
(2010g), headlined: ‘La incógnita del futuro consejo de administración’ [The future 
club board is a mistery]. In the body of the article, the newspaper said:  
 
El nuevo propietario del Málaga tiene decidida la composición del nuevo consejo de 
administración del Málaga, en el que estarán familiares y asesores directos del jeque 
Abdullah Al-Thani. Pero se mantienen las dudas sobre la continuidad de algunos de los 
anteriores (actuales) miembros de este órgano para afianzar la identidad de la sociedad. 
[The new owner of Málaga has decided the composition of the new club board, which will 
feature family members and close advisers to Sheikh Abdullah Al-Thani. However, there are  
many doubts as to whether old board members will continue in their positions in order to 
reinforce and maintain the club’s identity] (Diario Sur 2010g).  
 
Local political authorities in the city, quoted by Diario Sur (2010h) emphasize the 
need for continuity at the club. These politicians ‘hope’ that Sheikh Al-Thani decides 
to retain members of the old club board to ensure the identity of the club is not lost. 
Whether board members have any impact on a football club’s identity is of course 
questionable. In the same article there is a recurrent theme as to whether the 
outgoing owner and chairman, Fernando Sanz should remain onboard to advise 
Sheikh Al-Thani. Many of the quoted local political leaders express concern as to 
whether the new owner is willing to invest in the club’s academy which, in their 
view, is one of the key elements of the club’s identity.  
Thus, we can see here a very marked reluctance to change. Managing change and 
reluctance to change have been well researched in the academic literature. They are 
some of the biggest challenges for managers. In the sports sector this is further 
complicated because of the social and identity implications of football clubs. The 
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press reports around the plans of the new owner on Málaga clearly demonstrate a 
level of anxiety that runs along the hope for a brighter future and that dreamed 
‘quality jump’ that could enable the club to ‘make history’. The section moves now to 
explore the press’ representation of Málaga’s new owner. 
‘El jeque’, a social construction of the new owner 
The second major theme emerging from the thematic analysis is the characterisation 
of Sheikh Al-Thani and a clear process of social construction of the new owner. We 
can identify two different levels in this process. First, there is a good deal of 
description and characterisation of Sheikh Al-Thani himself and his immediate 
entourage. Second, we have identified a level of abstraction whereby the social 
construction is building an imaginary figure of a wealthy Arab businessman which 
is referred quite simple as ‘El jeque’ (The Sheikh). This of course applies to Al-Thani, 
but it emerges beyond him and it is used in a more general sense, even to affirm that 
many Spanish clubs would like to have ‘a Sheikh’. ‘El jeque’, therefore, is a socially 
constructed category of new football owner10. The best combination of this is an 
article published by Diario Sur on 15 June 2010 titled, quite simply ‘El Jeque’ (The 
Sheikh): 
El jeque ha llegado. El Málaga CF entra en la historia del fútbol español por ser el primer 
equipo de la Liga patria que pasa a ser propiedad de un empresario del Golfo Pérsico, en 
este caso el jeque Abdullah Bin Nasser Al-Thani, hijo del ministro del Interior de Qatar y 
descendiente directo de la familia real de aquel país. Al-Thani es la nueva esperanza 
blanquiazul  [The Sheikh has arrived. Málaga makes history of Spanish football by being the 
first club in the country to be owned by a businessman from the Gulf region. In this case, 
Sheikh Abdullah Bin Nasser Al-Thani, son of Qatar’s Home Affairs minister and direct 
descendant of the country´s royal family. Al-Thani is the new hope for the club] (Diario Sur 
2010i). 
The characterisation of ‘the sheikh’ is a mixture of orientalism and Western touches. 
Again, the tension between the unknown and the most familiar is also present in the 
descriptions of Sheikh Al-Thani. The new owner is portrayed as a successful 
businessman. There are numerous mentions to ‘petrodollars’ in clear reference to the 
                                                 
10 It is nowadays very common to find in the Spanish press references to ‘the sheikh of that club’ or ‘a 
sheikh is coming’, when they are referring just to wealthy business people originating from the Gulf 
states, but who are not Sheiks at all. One of the paper’s co-authors even found recently a newspaper 
referring to Roman Avramovich, the Russian owner of Chelsea, as ‘Chelsea’s sheikh’. Even if this is 
only a repeated observation when reading the Spanish press, it is clear that this figure of ‘el jeque’ is 
constant in the media. At this point this is just an observation, but it deserves further research and 
conceptualisation.  
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wealthy economy of Qatar. There are also references to the relation to Qatar’s royal 
family. This could be interpreted as a message to set the high status, both socially 
and economically, of the new owner. With the occasion of Al-Thani’s first visit to 
Málaga after completing the takeover, newspapers report on the sheikh’s way of life 
using a good number of clichés: Luxurious cars, enormous mansion by the sea, and a 
large number of servants… At the same time, given the very special historical 
relationship between Spain and the Arab world (even more especial in the case of 
Andalucía), the local Diario Sur makes use of the old word ‘Al-Andalus’, when 
reporting the interest of the Sheikh in investing in the region. This could be 
references both to the bright economic development of the region during the time of 
the Arab ruling or, contrariwise, a negative connotation depicting the investor as a 
coloniser (or a product of a reverse Reconquista). 
Whilst a good number of arabisation is found in this constructed image, it is 
interesting to find three elements that appear repeatedly: (1) The education in 
prestigious western (English in this case) universities, (2) the experience in managing 
football business in Qatar as member of the national FA board and club’s board, and 
(3) the sheikh’s success in business with the Western world. These clearly identify 
reassuring elements. There is a need to find elements to ensure that, despite coming 
from far away, the new owner is actually able to understand the local identity. There 
is a clear need to identify points of commonality with the western world, as well as a 
need to reassure the community of the vast business and football experience of the 
new owner. It is as if the community needs to construct an image of the new owner 
where they can be sure everything is going to go according to plan. Again, there is 
an interesting dynamic here of interest whilst, at the same time, a need to keep close 
references. 
Conclusion  
To conclude, for the French case, the emphasis is on the political and ideological 
aspects, at the determent of economic/ commercial account. Suspicion over Qatar’s 
investment in France and its increasing influence in French polity dominated the 
discourse of Marianne magazine. Although one could not claim that Marianne’s 
point of view is representative of French media, nor the French public opinion, but it 
replicates the current debate in France about Qatar’s increasing presence in diverse 
spheres of influence (culture, trade, media, and of course sport).   
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For the Spanish case there are two major themes emerging from the press. The first 
theme is a clear ‘threat versus opportunity’ dichotomy. It is almost impossible to 
decide whether the vision of the takeover is positive or negative. For every positive 
comment, there is always a cautious approach to the unknown intentions of the new 
owner. That is especially true before the formal takeover and during the first weeks 
of the new regime, whilst it tends to disappear once the football season was in full 
swing. Related to that, there is also a sense of a lack of clarity and information about 
the plans and the intentions of the new owners.  
The second theme is a social construction of the new owners with a good degree of 
‘arabisation’ or ‘orientalism’ in their characterisation. Here again one can find an 
interesting dichotomy. Whereas there is much attention paid to the Arab origin of 
the owner (clothing, cultural background, lifestyle, petrodollars, etc…), there is also 
a constant reference to his ‘European business education’ and his vast experience in 
football. It seems as if having experience in managing football issues and being 
educated in a western university combats the fear of “the unknown”. These are 
points to which the local population can relate and, thus, find a common (and safe) 
ground with the new owner. 
Last, but not least, the two case studies illustrate the new glocal dynamics and the 
emergence of new “centres” in the International football system. For some, this is a 
good indicator for the globalisation of the football market. For others, it is rather a 
sign of fragmentation and relativism i.e. an international football system without a 
centre.  The paper raises also a valuable debate about the governance of football in 
today’s economic climate. It is interesting to investigate how the process of the 
investment of Arab capital in European clubs is perceived at the local level, 
including in other contexts that are not covered in this paper (i.e. in England and in 
Germany). Moreover, the issue of foreign ownership also raises questions of 
regulation and systemic governance (as compared to global governance). Indeed, it 
is not difficult to find in the European press voices claiming that foreign ownership 
(not necessarily restricted here to Arab capital) is a step too far in the 
commercialization of the game. The argument basically is that foreign owners have 
little knowledge of the national and local context of the game and, therefore, they 
cannot make well informed decisions in the management of their club. Thus, many 
quite simply would be in favour of not allowing foreign investment in clubs. Others, 
perhaps more pragmatic, prefer to demand robust ‘fit and proper person’ tests for 
those investors, in order to ensure that they have the best interests of the club at 
heart. In any case, whether it is banning or just controlling club ownership, the 
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governance question is: who should take that decision? Should it be taken at 
continental or global level? Should it be regulated by public authorities or can 
football self-regulate? 
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